Lecture Notes for ECON 703 - ADVANCED MICRO I with Cramton at Maryland (UMD)

Notes Information

Material Type:Class Note
University:University of Maryland
  • Extensive Form
  • Unfortunately
  • Information
  • Important Result
  • Stable Equilibrium
  • Rationality
  • Formalization
  • Traditional
  • Probabilities
  • Definitions
Login / Sign Up to View Document
Preview Page 1Preview Page 2Preview Page 3Preview Page 4Preview Page 5Preview Page 6

Sample Document Text

Economics 703 Advanced Microeconomics Prof. Peter Cramton Lecture Note 4: Refinement1 Outline A. Subgame Perfection Revisited B. Sequential Equilibrium 1. Sequential Rationality 2. Consistency 3. Structural Consistency C. Trembling-Hand Perfection D. Strategic Stability 1. Backward Induction and Invariance 2. Admissibility and Iterated Dominance 3. Stable Equilibrium A. Subgame Perfection Revisited The refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept surveyed in this section are all attempts to extend the spirit of Selten's [1965] definition of subgame perfection to games with imperfect information. To begin, we review the effect of subgame perfection in games of perfect information and the problems that arise with imperfect information. Game 1: Normal Form l R -1,-1 r L 1, 1 2, 0 1, 1 2 1 1 1 l r L R 1 2 1: 2 -1 2: 0 -1 Extensive Form The normal form reveals that both (L...

Related Documents

Underpayment Inequity Notes
Egocentric Bias Exam
Invitation for Bids Notes
Reputational Method Exam
Instrumental Leader Notes
Instrumental Leader Notes
Instrumental Leader Notes
Marketspace Notes
Constructed Reality Notes
Significant Other Exam
Acting Crowd Exam
Voluntary Organization Exam
Cultural Degradation Exam
Backgrounders Exam
Participants Notes
Controversial Children Notes
155, "/var/app/current/tmp/"