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Class:MCOM 3320 - Mass Communications Law
Subject:MASS COMMUNICATIONS
University:Texas Tech University
Term:Spring 2011
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Schenck v. United States Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision that upheld the Espionage Act of 1917 and concluded that a defendant did not have a First Amendment right to freedom of speech against the draft during World War I. Ultimately, the case established the "clear and present danger" test. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist Party of America and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing to prospective military draftees during World War I, including 15,000 leaflets that advocated opposition to the draft. These leaflets contained statements such as; "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain," on the grounds that military conscription constituted involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. For these acts, Schenck was indicted and convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. Schenck appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the court decision violated his First Amendment rights.
Gitlow v. New York Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had extended the reach of certain provisions of the First Amendment—specifically the provisions protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the press—to the governments of the individual states. - This case is important because it changed the relationship between the federal courts and the states - Mr. Gitlow was convicted uner a New York law called the Criminal Anarchy Law. He was circulating a document called "Left Wing Manifesto". He was arrested because this document wanted communist socialism in the U.S. - Main concept is that it nationalizes the first amendment in the sense that the court is now saying that individual state laws CANNOT conflict with the first amendment or any of the rest of the bill or rights
Near v. Minnesota In 1927, Jay M. Near, who has been described as "anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-black and anti-labor"[2] began publishing The Saturday Press in Minneapolis with Howard A. Guilford, a former mayoral candidate who had been convicted of criminal libel. The paper claimed that Jewish gangs were "practically ruling" the city along with the police chief, Frank W. Brunskill, who was accused of participation in graft. Among the paper's other targets were mayor George E. Leach, Hennepin County attorney and future three-term governor Floyd B. Olson, and the members of the grand jury of Hennepin County, who the paper claimed were either incompetent or willfully failing to investigate and prosecute known criminal activity. Shortly after the first issue was distributed, Guilford was gunned down and hospitalized, where a further attempt on his life was made. At least one of the stories printed in The Saturday Press led to a successful prosecution of a gangster called Big Mose Barnett who had intimidated a local dry cleaner by destroying his customers' clothing. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), was a United States Supreme Court decision that recognized the freedom of the press by roundly rejecting prior restraints on publication, a principle that was applied to free speech generally in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court ruled that a Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "malicious" or "scandalous" newspapers violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment). Legal scholar and columnist Anthony Lewis called Near the Court's "first great press case."
Grosjean v. American Press Co. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court over a challenge to a separate sales tax on newspapers with circulation of over 20,000. - In 1934, at the request from a man by the name of Huey Long, Lousianna passed a law that imposed a 2% tax on printed material that had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies a week - Bottom line is that this law only affected 9 publishers in Louisiana: Ironically, ALL of these publications were ones that had been accusing Huey Long! -The petitioners went to federal court asking that this tax be overturned. They were successful! The Supreme Court compared this act to the Tax Act.
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Lovell v. Griffin Lovell v. City of Griffin, GA, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. This case was remarkable in its discussion of the requirement of persons to seek government sanction to distribute religious material. In this particular case, the Supreme Court ruled it was not constitutional for a city to require such sanction. Appellant, Alma Lovell, had been distributing literature as a Jehovah's Witness. She was arrested for this, pursuant to a city ordinance which read, in part, that the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin. Alma Lovell did not contest the fact that she was distributing material in violation of this ordinance, but attested that the ordinance itself was unconstitutional, in that it violated her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Thornhill v. Alabama Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), was a United States Supreme Court case heard in 1940. It reversed the conviction of the president of a local union for violating an Alabama statute that prohibited only labor picketing. Thornhill was peaceably picketing his employer during an authorized strike when he was arrested and charged. In reaching its decision, Associate Justice Frank Murphy wrote for the Supreme Court that the free speech clause protects speech about the facts and circumstances of a labor dispute. The statute in the case prohibited all labor picketing, but Thornhill added peaceful labor picketing to the area protected by free speech Byron Thornhill was convicted of "loitering or picketing" near a place of business, pursuant to § 3448 of the 1923 Code of Alabama.[2] Thornhill had been charged with loitering near the Brown Wood Preserving Company with the "intent or purpose of influencing others" to interfere with lawful business. After his conviction in the Inferior Court of Tuscaloosa County, he appealed to the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County. He was originally fined "$100 and costs," but was sentenced to prison for 59 days after not paying. After he failed his appeal, the circuit court increased the prison time to 73 days. Furthermore, the court of appeals affirmed the rulings of the two lower courts. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Thornhill's petition for certiorari, but the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted the petition
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the Court articulated the fighting words doctrine, a limitation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. In late November 1941, Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was using the public sidewalk as a pulpit in downtown Rochester, passing out pamphlets and calling organized religion a "racket." After a large crowd had begun blocking the roads and generally causing a scene, a police officer removed Chaplinsky to take him to police headquarters. Along the way he met the town marshal, who had earlier warned Chaplinsky to keep it down and avoid causing a commotion. Upon meeting the marshal for the second time, Chaplinsky attacked him verbally. The complaint against Chaplinsky charged that he had shouted: "You are a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" and was arrested. Chaplinsky admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the Deity. For this, he was arrested under a New Hampshire statute preventing intentionally offensive speech being directed at others in a public place. Under NH.'s Offensive Conduct law (chap. 378, para. 2 of the NH. Public Laws) it is illegal for anyone to address another person with "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place...or to call him by an offensive or derisive name." Chaplinsky was fined, but he appealed, claiming the law was "vague" and infringed upon his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech.
Dennis v. U.S. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case involving Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the Communist Party USA, which found that Dennis did not have a right under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if that exercise was in furtherance of a conspiracy to overthrow the government. Petitioners were indicted in July 1948 for violating a provision of the Smith Act. Petitioners were found guilty by the trial court and the decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari, but limited it to whether section two or three of the Smith Act violated the First Amendment and whether the same two sections violated the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness.
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Yates v. U.S. - Charged with violating the Smith Act - Mrs. Yates and her co workers were convicted, given 10,000 dollars and sentenced to 5 years in prison - All for being involved in the communist party and building it up - The case went to the Supreme Court - Justice Harlen wrote the opinion, "advocacy unlinked directly with plans for action, is protected speech" -Case was overturned!
U.S. v. O'Brien On the morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event.1 Immediately after the burning, members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien and his companions. An FBI agent ushered O'Brien to safety inside the courthouse. After he was advised of his right to counsel and to silence, O'Brien stated to FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed. For this act, O'Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States
Brandenburg v. Ohio Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), was a United States Supreme Court case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless it is directed to inciting and likely to incite imminent lawless action. In particular, it overruled Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader in rural Ohio, contacted a reporter at a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come and cover a KKK rally in Hamilton County in the summer of 1964.[1] Portions of the rally were filmed, showing several men in robes and hoods, some carrying firearms, first burning a cross and then making speeches. One of the speeches made reference to the possibility of "revengeance" [sic] against "niggers," "Jews," and those who supported them. One of the speeches also claimed that "our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race," and announced plans for a march on Washington to take place on the Fourth of July. Brandenburg was charged with advocating violence under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute for his participation in the rally and for the speech he made. In relevant part, the statute - enacted in 1919 during the First Red Scare - proscribed "advocat[ing] .. . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines Convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Brandenburg was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. On appeal, the Ohio First District Court of Appeal affirmed Brandenburg's conviction, rejecting his claim that the statute violated his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal without opinion. of criminal syndicalism."
Tinker v. Des moines School District Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that defined the constitutional rights of students in U.S. public schools. The Tinker test is still used by courts today to determine whether a school's disciplinary actions violate students' First Amendment rights. In December 1965, Des Moines, Iowa residents John F. Tinker (15 years old), John's younger sister Mary Beth Tinker (13 years old), and their friend Christopher Eckhardt (16 years old) decided to wear black armbands to their schools (high school for John and Christopher, junior high for Mary Beth) in protest of the Vietnam War and supporting the Christmas Truce called for by Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The principals of the Des Moines schools adopted a policy banning the wearing of armbands to school. Violating students would be suspended and allowed to return to school after agreeing to comply with the policy. Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt chose to violate this policy, and the next day John Tinker also did so. All were suspended from school until after January 1, 1966, when their protest had been scheduled to end A suit was not filed until after the Iowa Civil Liberties Union approached their family, and the ACLU agreed to help the family with the lawsuit. Their parents, in turn, filed suit in U.S. District Court, which upheld the decision of the Des Moines school board. A tie vote in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit meant that the U.S. District Court's decision continued to stand, and forced the Tinkers and Eckhardts to appeal to the Supreme Court directly. The case was argued before the court on November 12, 1968. The court's 7 to 2 decision held that the First Amendment applied to public schools, and that administrators would have to demonstrate constitutionally valid reasons for any specific regulation of speech in the classroom. The court observed, "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
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Cohen v. California Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with freedom of speech. The Court overturned a disturbing the peace conviction of a man wearing a jacket decorated with profanity. On April 26, 1968, Paul Robert Cohen, 19, was arrested for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" inside the Los Angeles Courthouse. Inside the court room he had the jacket folded over his arm, only after exiting the room he put the jacket on and was then arrested. He was convicted of violating section 415 of the California Penal Code, which prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct The conviction was upheld by the California Court of Appeal, which held that "offensive conduct" means "behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." After the California Supreme Court denied review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. The case was argued by Melville Nimmer, representing Paul Robert Cohen, and Michael Sauer, representing California. The Court, by a vote of 5-4, per Justice John Marshall Harlan II, overturned the appellate court's ruling. "[A]bsent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions," it said, "the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."[1] In his opinion Justice Harlan famously wrote "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."
New York Times v. U.S. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court per curiam decision. The ruling made it possible for the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers to publish the then-classified Pentagon Papers without risk of government censure. President Richard Nixon had claimed executive authority to force the Times to suspend publication of classified information in its possession. The question before the court was whether the constitutional freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was subordinate to a claimed need of the executive branch of government to maintain the secrecy of information. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did protect the right of the New York Times' to print the materials. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the two lower courts which had originally decided that the government had not met its "heavy burden" of showing a justification for a prior restraint. The Court issued a very brief per curiam opinion, stating only that the Court concurred with the decisions of the two lower courts to reject the Government’s request for an injunction
Miami Herald v. Tornillo After appellant newspaper had refused to print appellee's replies to editorials critical of appellee's candidacy for state office, appellee brought suit in Florida Circuit Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages, based on Florida's 'right of reply' statute that grants a political candidate a right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, and making it a misdemeanor for the newspaper to fail to comply. The Circuit Court held the statute unconstitutional as infringing on the freedom of the press and dismissed the action. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did not violate constitutional guarantees, and that civil remedies, including damages, were available, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Held: - This case works it's way to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the decision writing that "any attempt by the government to force a newspaper to publish rejected material, violates the constitution in 4 ways: 1. Lots of court decision before said the same thing 2. Compelled publication represents a prior restraint 3. If the publisher is forced to carry more, his cost increases, and thus the government has imposed an economic penalty amounting to the taking of property which is in violation of both the 5th and 14th amendments 4. The court said that IF all of this took place, it would lead editors to steer clear of controversy and reduce political debate
Bigelow v. Virginia Bigelow v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)[1], was a case from the 1974 term of the Supreme Court of the United States. It established First Amendment protection for advertising Court precedents had long considered advertising mere "commercial speech," giving it little, if any, protection under the First Amendment.[3] In 1972, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a Supreme Court appeal on behalf of a newspaper editor in Charlottesville, Virginia who had published an advertisement for an abortion referral service in New York (where abortion was legal).[4] Virginia charged the editor, Jeffrey C. Bigelow, with violating a state law that made it a crime to encourage abortions via lectures, advertisements, or any other manner.[5] Bigelow was convicted and fined; the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, rejecting his First Amendment challenge by pointing to the lowered protections on commercial advertisements Roe v. Wade was pending when Bigelow's appeal first reached the Supreme Court, leading the justices to defer action.[5] After Roe was decided, the justices remanded Bigelow to Virginia, but the state court reaffirmed Bigelow's conviction; Bigelow filed a new appeal to the Supreme Court
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Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party -Skokie was a suburb of Chicago that was primarily Jewish -A Nazi group wanted to protest in skokie and dress as Hitler and wave Nazi flags \-The citizens of skokie went to their village council. The Skokie park district required the protest group to put up a 350,000 dollar bond. This infuriated the Nazi's so they changed their protest from the immigration of schools, towards the insurance company in Skokie that required the bond -The court ruled that a speaker who gives prior notice of his message has not compelled a confrontation. Pretty much, you know what they're going to protest about, if you don't like it, don't show up
U.S. v. Progressive Inc - An appeals court case that winds up becoming moot - In early 1979 the editors of progressive magazine announce that they're about ready to publish a series of articles called the H bomb secret. They said that anybody with the technology could build the bomb in the attempt to abolish nuclear weapons The justice dept saw these promotions and sought after justice
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com. (1980) helped solidify what is known as the time, place, and manner doctrine - Con Ed, a public utility, included in its utility bills statements of ConEd's "views on matters of public policy controversies" - One of these was a piece advocating Nuclear Power included in Jan. 1976 bills - Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) asked in March to enclose a counter insert. ConEd declined - NRDC went to public Serv. Comish. asking to have ConEd's billing packages opten to "opposing views on controversial issues of public importance." (FCC fairness) - Comission instead in Feb. 1977writes rule forbid utilities to use bill inserts to "discuss political matters, including the desirability of the future dev. of nuclear power." Argues captive audience should not be subjected to company's political views. Rule allowed non controversy issues of public policy - ConEd challenges on free speech, equal protection grounds. We test whether government can limit such, and if so, under what conditions. -Court overturns, ruling state can regulate time, place, and manner of speech, but not the ocntent
Snepp v. U.S. Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to the Agency for prepublication review. As an express condition of his employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had executed an agreement promising that he would "not . . . publish . . . any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his] employment . . . without specific prior approval by the Agency." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 78-1871, p. 59a. The promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the Government's concession—for the purposes of this litigation—that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. Id., at 935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government—in a jury trial could prove tortious conduct.
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Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness (1981) The court refined its position on time, place, and manner - Minnesota State Fair had a rule saying anyone selling or distributing merchandise or handouts on fair grounds must work from a booth they rent from the fair. - Society challenges - Supreme cour tsays Minnesota regulation met three tests for a time, place, and manner rule 1. Must be content neutral (applies to everyone) 2. Serve significant government interest (like public safety) 3. Leave ample alternative channels
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeir - Involved freedom of press on a school campus - In 1983 the principle of East Hazelwood high school removed 2 pages from the student newspaper which contained articles of teenage pregnancy and the impact of parent divorce on children - Kuhlmeier was a student editor - The students protested that they had constitutional rights. This was prior restraint of freedom of the press. The shcool argues that they were acting in the interest of privacy of the individuals and editorial balance - The district court upheld the school district by saying censorship was ok in this case. Appeals court disagreed. The case finally goes to the Supreme Court - The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court decision by saying censorship in this case was ok! Because THE SCHOOL OWNED the newspaper! As a result of this decision, several things happened with student newspapers, especially on college campuses - The difference between these two cases is that in the Kuhlmeier case, the school owned the newspaper, therefore, they make the decision
Texas v. Johnson Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that invalidated prohibitions on desecrating the American flag enforced in 48 of the 50 states. Justice William Brennan wrote for a five-justice majority in holding that the defendant's act of flag burning was protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Johnson was represented by attorneys David D. Cole and William Kunstler. Gregory Lee Johnson, then a member of the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade, participated in a political demonstration during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas. The demonstrators were protesting the policies of the Reagan Administration and of certain companies based in Dallas. They marched through the streets, shouted chants, and held signs outside the offices of several companies. At one point, another demonstrator handed Johnson an American flag stolen from a flagpole outside one of the targeted buildings. When the demonstrators reached Dallas City Hall, Johnson poured kerosene on the flag and set it on fire. During the burning of the flag, demonstrators shouted such phrases as, "America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you, you stand for plunder, you will go under," and, "Reagan, Mondale, which will it be? Either one means World War III." No one was hurt, but some witnesses to the flag burning said they were extremely offended. One witness, Daniel E. Walker, received international attention when he collected the burned remains of the flag and buried them according to military protocol in his backyard - Congress adopts Flag Protection Act of 1989, making it illegal to knowingly mutilate, deface, defile, burn or trample on an American flag. Supreme court in U.S. v. Eichman, citing Johnson, that federal statute was unconstitutional restraint of speech
RAV v. City of St. Paul R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) was a United States Supreme Court case involving hate speech and the free speech clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A unanimous Court struck down St. Paul, Minnesota's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, and in doing so overturned the conviction of a teenager, referred to in court documents only as R.A.V., for burning a cross on the lawn of an African American family. In the early morning hours of June 21, 1990, the petitioner and several other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs.[1] The cross was erected and burned in the front yard of an African American family that lived across the street from the house where the petitioner was staying.[1] Petitioner, who was a juvenile at the time, was charged with two counts, one of which a violation of the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.[1] The Ordinance provided Whoever places on public or private property, a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice David Souter, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Byron White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in full, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in part. Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which was joined in part by Justice White and Justice Blackmun.
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 Schenck v. United StatesSchenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision that upheld the Espionage Act of 1917 and concluded that a defendant did not have a First Amendment right to freedom of speech against the draft during World War I. Ultimately, the case established the "clear and present danger" test. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist Party of America and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing to prospective military draftees during World War I, including 15,000 leaflets that advocated opposition to the draft. These leaflets contained statements such as; "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain," on the grounds that military conscription constituted involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. For these acts, Schenck was indicted and convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. Schenck appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the court decision violated his First Amendment rights.





 Gitlow v. New YorkGitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had extended the reach of certain provisions of the First Amendment—specifically the provisions protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the press—to the governments of the individual states.
- This case is important because it changed the relationship between the federal courts and the states
- Mr. Gitlow was convicted uner a New York law called the Criminal Anarchy Law. He was circulating a document called "Left Wing Manifesto". He was arrested because this document wanted communist socialism in the U.S.
- Main concept is that it nationalizes the first amendment in the sense that the court is now saying that individual state laws CANNOT conflict with the first amendment or any of the rest of the bill or rights
 Near v. Minnesota In 1927, Jay M. Near, who has been described as "anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-black and anti-labor"[2] began publishing The Saturday Press in Minneapolis with Howard A. Guilford, a former mayoral candidate who had been convicted of criminal libel.
The paper claimed that Jewish gangs were "practically ruling" the city along with the police chief, Frank W. Brunskill, who was accused of participation in graft. Among the paper's other targets were mayor George E. Leach, Hennepin County attorney and future three-term governor Floyd B. Olson, and the members of the grand jury of Hennepin County, who the paper claimed were either incompetent or willfully failing to investigate and prosecute known criminal activity.
Shortly after the first issue was distributed, Guilford was gunned down and hospitalized, where a further attempt on his life was made. At least one of the stories printed in The Saturday Press led to a successful prosecution of a gangster called Big Mose Barnett who had intimidated a local dry cleaner by destroying his customers' clothing.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), was a United States Supreme Court decision that recognized the freedom of the press by roundly rejecting prior restraints on publication, a principle that was applied to free speech generally in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court ruled that a Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "malicious" or "scandalous" newspapers violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment). Legal scholar and columnist Anthony Lewis called Near the Court's "first great press case."


 Grosjean v. American Press Co.Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court over a challenge to a separate sales tax on newspapers with circulation of over 20,000.
- In 1934, at the request from a man by the name of Huey Long, Lousianna passed a law that imposed a 2% tax on printed material that had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies a week
- Bottom line is that this law only affected 9 publishers in Louisiana: Ironically, ALL of these publications were ones that had been accusing Huey Long!
-The petitioners went to federal court asking that this tax be overturned. They were successful! The Supreme Court compared this act to the Tax Act.

 Lovell v. Griffin Lovell v. City of Griffin, GA, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. This case was remarkable in its discussion of the requirement of persons to seek government sanction to distribute religious material. In this particular case, the Supreme Court ruled it was not constitutional for a city to require such sanction.
Appellant, Alma Lovell, had been distributing literature as a Jehovah's Witness. She was arrested for this, pursuant to a city ordinance which read, in part, that the
practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin.
Alma Lovell did not contest the fact that she was distributing material in violation of this ordinance, but attested that the ordinance itself was unconstitutional, in that it violated her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.




 Thornhill v. Alabama Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), was a United States Supreme Court case heard in 1940. It reversed the conviction of the president of a local union for violating an Alabama statute that prohibited only labor picketing. Thornhill was peaceably picketing his employer during an authorized strike when he was arrested and charged. In reaching its decision, Associate Justice Frank Murphy wrote for the Supreme Court that the free speech clause protects speech about the facts and circumstances of a labor dispute. The statute in the case prohibited all labor picketing, but Thornhill added peaceful labor picketing to the area protected by free speech
Byron Thornhill was convicted of "loitering or picketing" near a place of business, pursuant to § 3448 of the 1923 Code of Alabama.[2] Thornhill had been charged with loitering near the Brown Wood Preserving Company with the "intent or purpose of influencing others" to interfere with lawful business. After his conviction in the Inferior Court of Tuscaloosa County, he appealed to the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County. He was originally fined "$100 and costs," but was sentenced to prison for 59 days after not paying. After he failed his appeal, the circuit court increased the prison time to 73 days. Furthermore, the court of appeals affirmed the rulings of the two lower courts. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Thornhill's petition for certiorari, but the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted the petition
 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the Court articulated the fighting words doctrine, a limitation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
In late November 1941, Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was using the public sidewalk as a pulpit in downtown Rochester, passing out pamphlets and calling organized religion a "racket." After a large crowd had begun blocking the roads and generally causing a scene, a police officer removed Chaplinsky to take him to police headquarters. Along the way he met the town marshal, who had earlier warned Chaplinsky to keep it down and avoid causing a commotion. Upon meeting the marshal for the second time, Chaplinsky attacked him verbally. The complaint against Chaplinsky charged that he had shouted: "You are a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" and was arrested. Chaplinsky admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the Deity.
For this, he was arrested under a New Hampshire statute preventing intentionally offensive speech being directed at others in a public place. Under NH.'s Offensive Conduct law (chap. 378, para. 2 of the NH. Public Laws) it is illegal for anyone to address another person with "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place...or to call him by an offensive or derisive name."
Chaplinsky was fined, but he appealed, claiming the law was "vague" and infringed upon his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech.




 Dennis v. U.S. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case involving Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the Communist Party USA, which found that Dennis did not have a right under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if that exercise was in furtherance of a conspiracy to overthrow the government.
Petitioners were indicted in July 1948 for violating a provision of the Smith Act. Petitioners were found guilty by the trial court and the decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari, but limited it to whether section two or three of the Smith Act violated the First Amendment and whether the same two sections violated the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness.


 Yates v. U.S.- Charged with violating the Smith Act
- Mrs. Yates and her co workers were convicted, given 10,000 dollars and sentenced to 5 years in prison
- All for being involved in the communist party and building it up
- The case went to the Supreme Court
- Justice Harlen wrote the opinion, "advocacy unlinked directly with plans for action, is protected speech"
-Case was overturned!
 U.S. v. O'Brien On the morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event.1 Immediately after the burning, members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien and his companions. An FBI agent ushered O'Brien to safety inside the courthouse. After he was advised of his right to counsel and to silence, O'Brien stated to FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed.
For this act, O'Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States
 Brandenburg v. Ohio Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), was a United States Supreme Court case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless it is directed to inciting and likely to incite imminent lawless action. In particular, it overruled Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence.
Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader in rural Ohio, contacted a reporter at a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come and cover a KKK rally in Hamilton County in the summer of 1964.[1] Portions of the rally were filmed, showing several men in robes and hoods, some carrying firearms, first burning a cross and then making speeches. One of the speeches made reference to the possibility of "revengeance" [sic] against "niggers," "Jews," and those who supported them. One of the speeches also claimed that "our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race," and announced plans for a march on Washington to take place on the Fourth of July. Brandenburg was charged with advocating violence under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute for his participation in the rally and for the speech he made. In relevant part, the statute - enacted in 1919 during the First Red Scare - proscribed "advocat[ing] .. . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines Convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Brandenburg was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. On appeal, the Ohio First District Court of Appeal affirmed Brandenburg's conviction, rejecting his claim that the statute violated his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal without opinion.

of criminal syndicalism."


 Tinker v. Des moines School District Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that defined the constitutional rights of students in U.S. public schools. The Tinker test is still used by courts today to determine whether a school's disciplinary actions violate students' First Amendment rights.
In December 1965, Des Moines, Iowa residents John F. Tinker (15 years old), John's younger sister Mary Beth Tinker (13 years old), and their friend Christopher Eckhardt (16 years old) decided to wear black armbands to their schools (high school for John and Christopher, junior high for Mary Beth) in protest of the Vietnam War and supporting the Christmas Truce called for by Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The principals of the Des Moines schools adopted a policy banning the wearing of armbands to school. Violating students would be suspended and allowed to return to school after agreeing to comply with the policy. Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt chose to violate this policy, and the next day John Tinker also did so. All were suspended from school until after January 1, 1966, when their protest had been scheduled to end
A suit was not filed until after the Iowa Civil Liberties Union approached their family, and the ACLU agreed to help the family with the lawsuit. Their parents, in turn, filed suit in U.S. District Court, which upheld the decision of the Des Moines school board. A tie vote in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit meant that the U.S. District Court's decision continued to stand, and forced the Tinkers and Eckhardts to appeal to the Supreme Court directly. The case was argued before the court on November 12, 1968.
The court's 7 to 2 decision held that the First Amendment applied to public schools, and that administrators would have to demonstrate constitutionally valid reasons for any specific regulation of speech in the classroom. The court observed, "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."

 Cohen v. California Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with freedom of speech. The Court overturned a disturbing the peace conviction of a man wearing a jacket decorated with profanity.
On April 26, 1968, Paul Robert Cohen, 19, was arrested for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" inside the Los Angeles Courthouse. Inside the court room he had the jacket folded over his arm, only after exiting the room he put the jacket on and was then arrested. He was convicted of violating section 415 of the California Penal Code, which prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct
The conviction was upheld by the California Court of Appeal, which held that "offensive conduct" means "behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." After the California Supreme Court denied review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. The case was argued by Melville Nimmer, representing Paul Robert Cohen, and Michael Sauer, representing California.
The Court, by a vote of 5-4, per Justice John Marshall Harlan II, overturned the appellate court's ruling. "[A]bsent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions," it said, "the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."[1] In his opinion Justice Harlan famously wrote "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."


 New York Times v. U.S.New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court per curiam decision. The ruling made it possible for the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers to publish the then-classified Pentagon Papers without risk of government censure.
President Richard Nixon had claimed executive authority to force the Times to suspend publication of classified information in its possession. The question before the court was whether the constitutional freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was subordinate to a claimed need of the executive branch of government to maintain the secrecy of information. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did protect the right of the New York Times' to print the materials.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the two lower courts which had originally decided that the government had not met its "heavy burden" of showing a justification for a prior restraint. The Court issued a very brief per curiam opinion, stating only that the Court concurred with the decisions of the two lower courts to reject the Government’s request for an injunction

 Miami Herald v. Tornillo After appellant newspaper had refused to print appellee's replies to editorials critical of appellee's candidacy for state office, appellee brought suit in Florida Circuit Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages, based on Florida's 'right of reply' statute that grants a political candidate a right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, and making it a misdemeanor for the newspaper to fail to comply. The Circuit Court held the statute unconstitutional as infringing on the freedom of the press and dismissed the action. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did not violate constitutional guarantees, and that civil remedies, including damages, were available, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Held:
- This case works it's way to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the decision writing that "any attempt by the government to force a newspaper to publish rejected material, violates the constitution in 4 ways:
1. Lots of court decision before said the same thing
2. Compelled publication represents a prior restraint
3. If the publisher is forced to carry more, his cost increases, and thus the government has imposed an economic penalty amounting to the taking of property which is in violation of both the 5th and 14th amendments
4. The court said that IF all of this took place, it would lead editors to steer clear of controversy and reduce political debate

 Bigelow v. Virginia Bigelow v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)[1], was a case from the 1974 term of the Supreme Court of the United States. It established First Amendment protection for advertising
Court precedents had long considered advertising mere "commercial speech," giving it little, if any, protection under the First Amendment.[3]
In 1972, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a Supreme Court appeal on behalf of a newspaper editor in Charlottesville, Virginia who had published an advertisement for an abortion referral service in New York (where abortion was legal).[4] Virginia charged the editor, Jeffrey C. Bigelow, with violating a state law that made it a crime to encourage abortions via lectures, advertisements, or any other manner.[5] Bigelow was convicted and fined; the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, rejecting his First Amendment challenge by pointing to the lowered protections on commercial advertisements
Roe v. Wade was pending when Bigelow's appeal first reached the Supreme Court, leading the justices to defer action.[5] After Roe was decided, the justices remanded Bigelow to Virginia, but the state court reaffirmed Bigelow's conviction; Bigelow filed a new appeal to the Supreme Court

 Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party -Skokie was a suburb of Chicago that was primarily Jewish
-A Nazi group wanted to protest in skokie and dress as Hitler and wave Nazi flags
\-The citizens of skokie went to their village council. The Skokie park district required the protest group to put up a 350,000 dollar bond. This infuriated the Nazi's so they changed their protest from the immigration of schools, towards the insurance company in Skokie that required the bond
-The court ruled that a speaker who gives prior notice of his message has not compelled a confrontation. Pretty much, you know what they're going to protest about, if you don't like it, don't show up
 U.S. v. Progressive Inc- An appeals court case that winds up becoming moot
- In early 1979 the editors of progressive magazine announce that they're about ready to publish a series of articles called the H bomb secret. They said that anybody with the technology could build the bomb in the attempt to abolish nuclear weapons
The justice dept saw these promotions and sought after justice
 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com. (1980) helped solidify what is known as the time, place, and manner doctrine
- Con Ed, a public utility, included in its utility bills statements of ConEd's "views on matters of public policy controversies"
- One of these was a piece advocating Nuclear Power included in Jan. 1976 bills
- Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) asked in March to enclose a counter insert. ConEd declined
- NRDC went to public Serv. Comish. asking to have ConEd's billing packages opten to "opposing views on controversial issues of public importance." (FCC fairness)
- Comission instead in Feb. 1977writes rule forbid utilities to use bill inserts to "discuss political matters, including the desirability of the future dev. of nuclear power." Argues captive audience should not be subjected to company's political views. Rule allowed non controversy issues of public policy
- ConEd challenges on free speech, equal protection grounds. We test whether government can limit such, and if so, under what conditions.
-Court overturns, ruling state can regulate time, place, and manner of speech, but not the ocntent
 Snepp v. U.S. Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to the Agency for prepublication review. As an express condition of his employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had executed an agreement promising that he would "not . . . publish . . . any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his] employment . . . without specific prior approval by the Agency." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 78-1871, p. 59a. The promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the Government's concession—for the purposes of this litigation—that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. Id., at 935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government—in a jury trial could prove tortious conduct.
 Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness (1981) The court refined its position on time, place, and manner
- Minnesota State Fair had a rule saying anyone selling or distributing merchandise or handouts on fair grounds must work from a booth they rent from the fair.
- Society challenges
- Supreme cour tsays Minnesota regulation met three tests for a time, place, and manner rule
1. Must be content neutral (applies to everyone)
2. Serve significant government interest (like public safety)
3. Leave ample alternative channels
 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeir - Involved freedom of press on a school campus
- In 1983 the principle of East Hazelwood high school removed 2 pages from the student newspaper which contained articles of teenage pregnancy and the impact of parent divorce on children
- Kuhlmeier was a student editor
- The students protested that they had constitutional rights. This was prior restraint of freedom of the press. The shcool argues that they were acting in the interest of privacy of the individuals and editorial balance
- The district court upheld the school district by saying censorship was ok in this case. Appeals court disagreed. The case finally goes to the Supreme Court
- The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court decision by saying censorship in this case was ok! Because THE SCHOOL OWNED the newspaper! As a result of this decision, several things happened with student newspapers, especially on college campuses
- The difference between these two cases is that in the Kuhlmeier case, the school owned the newspaper, therefore, they make the decision
 Texas v. Johnson Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that invalidated prohibitions on desecrating the American flag enforced in 48 of the 50 states. Justice William Brennan wrote for a five-justice majority in holding that the defendant's act of flag burning was protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Johnson was represented by attorneys David D. Cole and William Kunstler.
Gregory Lee Johnson, then a member of the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade, participated in a political demonstration during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas. The demonstrators were protesting the policies of the Reagan Administration and of certain companies based in Dallas. They marched through the streets, shouted chants, and held signs outside the offices of several companies. At one point, another demonstrator handed Johnson an American flag stolen from a flagpole outside one of the targeted buildings.
When the demonstrators reached Dallas City Hall, Johnson poured kerosene on the flag and set it on fire. During the burning of the flag, demonstrators shouted such phrases as, "America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you, you stand for plunder, you will go under," and, "Reagan, Mondale, which will it be? Either one means World War III." No one was hurt, but some witnesses to the flag burning said they were extremely offended. One witness, Daniel E. Walker, received international attention when he collected the burned remains of the flag and buried them according to military protocol in his backyard
- Congress adopts Flag Protection Act of 1989, making it illegal to knowingly mutilate, deface, defile, burn or trample on an American flag. Supreme court in U.S. v. Eichman, citing Johnson, that federal statute was unconstitutional restraint of speech

 RAV v. City of St. PaulR. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) was a United States Supreme Court case involving hate speech and the free speech clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A unanimous Court struck down St. Paul, Minnesota's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, and in doing so overturned the conviction of a teenager, referred to in court documents only as R.A.V., for burning a cross on the lawn of an African American family.
In the early morning hours of June 21, 1990, the petitioner and several other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs.[1] The cross was erected and burned in the front yard of an African American family that lived across the street from the house where the petitioner was staying.[1] Petitioner, who was a juvenile at the time, was charged with two counts, one of which a violation of the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.[1] The Ordinance provided
Whoever places on public or private property, a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice David Souter, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Byron White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in full, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in part. Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which was joined in part by Justice White and Justice Blackmun.

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